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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between mistrust, adversarial industrial
relations and safety performance in 10 Australian coal mines, across three mining
companies. Based on case study research and company safety data, the article identifies a
‘cluster of characteristics’ closely associated with the formation of mistrust, and examines
the negative impact such characteristics can have on safety performance. The article
considers the broader ramifications of these findings for non-mining sectors, in particular
for companies with a corporate head office overseeing separate sites, and identifies ways of
building trust.
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Introduction
There is growing evidence that trust between corporate and site management,
and between management and the workforce, is crucial to improved safety
outcomes. Indeed, trust is often referred to as the lubricant for open and fre-
quent safety communication (Reason, 1997), and as crucial in maintaining
cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), promoting the acceptance of decisions
Contact address: Darren Sinclair, Fenner School of Environment and Society,
The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia.
[email: darren.sinclair@anu.edu.au]
450
(Tyler, 2003), improving knowledge-sharing (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002), support-
ing all aspects of organizational functioning (Bijlsma and Koopman, 2003) and
enhancing safety performance (Barling and Hutchinson, 2000). Lack of trust is
closely associated with a history of adversarial industrial relations, although a
number of other factors also contribute to its development.
Trust can be regarded as an individual’s or group’s belief that another indi-
vidual or group makes good faith efforts to behave in accordance with explicit
or implicit commitments, is honest in negotiations preceding such commit-
ments, and does not take excessive advantage of the other, even when the
opportunity arises (Cummings and Bromley, 1996). In the context of worker
and management relations around safety, trust is best understood as an indi-
vidual’s willingness to rely on another person, based on expectations that he or
she will act safely or intends to act safely. For example, management might trust
workers not to ‘cut corners’, break safety rules or take unreasonable risks.
Workers in turn might trust management to keep them safe (Risk Analysis,
2006).
Notwithstanding the crucial importance of trust to improving safety perfor-
mance, there is a paucity of research examining the concept within the realms of
safety (Cox et al., 2004). There is still much we do not know about how trust is
best nurtured, how it is lost and might best be regained, the consequences of an
absence of trust, how it varies between different groups within an organization,
and the relationship between trust and industrial relations (Conchie et al., 2006;
Risk Analysis, 2006; Zeffane and Connell, 2003).
This article explores trust in the context of the Australian mining industry, an
industry that has more reason than most to have major concerns about a lack of
trust, given its long history of acrimonious industrial relations. Indeed, the 2005
New South Wales Mine Safety Review identified a ‘debilitating mistrust
between the members of the tripartite process’ (Wran and McClelland, 2005)
as a principal obstacle to improved safety in the industry. In Western Australia,
the Ritter Report documented the enormous difficulties of successfully imple-
menting managerial safety strategy with ‘a workforce of whom a significant
number had strong opposition to a key management strategy’ (Ritter, 2004).
In Queensland, a 2005 report pointed to a series of disputes that have had a
detrimental effect on trust between the inspectorate, the Construction,
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and mine operators, and the antagonistic
and confrontational climate that is not conducive to optimal safety outcomes
(ACIL Tasman, 2005).
In Tasmania, the report of the investigation of the Beaconsfield Gold Mine
collapse provides several pertinent insights (Melick, 2006). In particular, the
report detailed that there was a prevailing atmosphere of mistrust that had
undermined safety reporting and responses prior to the incident (Quinlan,
2007). Further, it highlighted the limitations of relying on ‘top-down’ safety
management, which in turn can undermine worker perceptions of the effective-
ness of, and trust in, corporate safety initiatives (a phenomenon that may be
replicated across the industry). Finally, in his concluding report, the Coroner
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highlighted the failings of risk assessments that did not adequately consult
workers (Chandler, 2009).
There are a variety of reasons why building trust is far from easy in the
mining industry. For many years, workers and management have been polar-
ized on a plethora of issues; relations between unions and mining companies
are often acrimonious; and although safety might arguably be kept separate
from industrial relations (Carson and Hennenberg, 1988), in practice, it is
often ensnared within it (Creighton and Gunningham, 1985). Hostile labour
relations, it is argued, may be further entrenched within export-oriented
and/or foreign-owned companies (as applies to many Australian coal-
mining companies, and two of the three companies in this research),
which have historically been less amicable towards Australian labour interests
(Bennett, 1994).
Notwithstanding the argument that there is no place for industrial relations
in safety because both sides have common interests (Robens, 1972), this is not a
view supported by history. On the contrary, in the event of disagreement (as
when the production process is speeded up to the detriment of safety), common
interest evaporates (Berman, 1978; Carson, 1981; Nichols and Armstrong,
1973). On this view, industrial relations and safety cannot be kept apart. As
such, achieving a cooperative and constructive approach to safety, and enlisting
worker participation to improve safety outcomes, presents an enormous
challenge, which is unlikely to be resolved in the absence of trust.
In the Australian mining industry (and coal-mining in particular), trust has
been an extremely scarce commodity. Many managers express a strong mis-
trust of union-dominated workforces and of union representatives in partic-
ular, and, even in the absence of unions, regard the entrenched attitudes and
behaviours of many mine-workers as being antithetical to modern manage-
ment and improved safety outcomes. In turn, many workers and their rep-
resentatives have a deep mistrust of, and hostility towards, management
borne from a history of death, injury and disease for which employers
were, historically, hardly blameless (Hargraves, 1993; Shaw and Bruns,
1947). Lockouts, strikes and the use of leverage (by both sides, depending
on the economic climate) have also left their scars (McColl, 1982), reinfor-
cing negative stereotypes. The fact that both government and employer pri-
orities sometimes seemed to exclude safety considerations, and that the
‘welfare of mine workers and families is regarded as subsidiary’ (Bullimore,
1999), served to entrench worker mistrust.
This article examines the relationship between trust (and mistrust) and safety.
The second section outlines the methodology and the third section describes a
cluster of characteristics identified as being at the heart of mistrust between
workers and management. The fourth section discusses the implications of
these findings, including the interaction between different characteristics and
a ‘tipping point’ beyond which mistrust becomes both entrenched and a potent
constraint on safety. The article concludes with some comments on how
mistrust might best be overcome and trust created.
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Methodology
This research was based on in-depth interviews with corporate and mine man-
agement, union officials and miners across 10 mine sites, three companies (four
each from the first and second companies, and two from the third) and two
states (eight in New South Wales and two in Queensland). The intention was to
identify and examine (where they existed) critical relationships between safety
and trust (or a lack thereof ). Researching different mine sites within individual
companies enabled a number of variables to be held constant across those com-
panies (in particular, corporate management approaches and safety systems)
while exploring variation in others (namely, differences in safety performance
and levels of trust at the mine site level).
We began by identifying high and low safety-performing mine sites within
each of the companies (and avoiding sites in the middle of the spectrum) – no
attempt was made to pre-judge individual mine sites as being either high or low
in trust. To do this, internal Occupational Health and Safety [OHS] statistical
measures (including lost time due to injuries, total recordable injuries, incident
reporting and workers’ compensation data), together with the annual results of
internal company safety audits, were collated over a five-year period1 and then
aggregated and weighted (with the weighting factor of 5 given to the most
recent year’s data, stepping down by 1 through each year to a factor of 1 for
the five-year-old data) to give each mine a safety-performance ranking (the
combination of different statistical data makes it more reliable than if we
relied on, in particular, lost time injury data alone, which has been subject to
legitimate criticism of being open to manipulation; see Hopkins, 2002b). In
addition, corporate managers (including corporate safety managers) provided a
subjective (and independent and confidential) ranking of the safety performance
of the mine sites within each of their respective companies.
The combined ranking process produced three striking results. First, there
were very large differences in the aggregated statistical weightings between the
highest- and lowest-ranked mines. Second, the spread of mines was highly
polarized, with distinct groupings at the high, middle and low rankings.
Third, there was a very high degree of consistency between the quantitative
(aggregated statistics) and qualitative (managers’ views) rankings, with only
limited differences in the middle rankings. On the basis of these results, then,
mine sites for inclusion in the research project were selected from only the
highest and lowest safety rankings. This methodology was deemed sufficiently
robust for the purpose of this research project (which was, simply, to identify
mine sites within each company at either end of the safety-performance spec-
trum, and not to identify and quantify in detail the precise gradations across the
entire spectrum).2
Following the selection of high and low safety-performing mine sites, field-
work was conducted between August 2007 and May 2008 with the full coop-
eration of the participating companies, key unions and the workforce.
The principal means of data collection was semi-structured interviews as this
method yields more unexpected insights and candid revelations than a more
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structured interview or survey method, and allows the interview to be tailored
to the circumstances and experiences of each interviewee.
A total of 120 interviews were conducted. In each two-day site visit, 12
interviews were typically conducted spanning senior, middle and line manage-
ment, and workers. The balance of management and worker interviews was
approximately equal. In addition to the site interviews, 12 representatives
from corporate management (including chief executives, corporate safety man-
agers and operational managers) were interviewed across the three participating
companies. Twelve inspectors were interviewed across both jurisdictions,
including mines inspectors and electrical and mechanical engineering inspec-
tors, and discussions were held with a chief mines inspector. Six union officials
were interviewed across both jurisdictions (either district check inspectors,
industry safety representatives or industry check inspectors), and discussions
were held with a senior union official. Generally, interviews lasted between 40
and 60 minutes, were conducted in private (but in the field), and consisted of a
series of questions or prompts addressing the following topics: the nature of
their relationship, communication and history with their superiors, subordi-
nates and/or peers (in the case of company managers and workers, and depend-
ing upon applicability); the nature of their relationship, communication and
history with company managers and workers (in the case of union officials and
inspectors); the impact of these relationships on safety practices and perfor-
mance; and their perceptions of company safety policies and procedures.
Interviewees were provided with an information statement of the research proj-
ect and a consent form (signed by each participant), and were informed in
advance that all information arising from their interviews would be treated
confidentially and used anonymously in any subsequent publications.3
Qualitative data arising from the interviews was subject to ‘grounded theory’
– this entailed transcript material being codified and collated into ‘like’ cate-
gories, which in turn were analysed for relationship patterns and used to inform
our research findings (Charmaz, 2006). The qualitative data was supplemented
by reviews of the domestic and international literature and internal policy
and safety-related information provided by the three participating mining
companies.
Findings: A Cluster of Mistrust
The mine sites with low safety performance displayed a cluster of characteristics
strongly associated with a heightened presence of mistrust. This is not to sug-
gest that all the lower-performing sites expressed identical characteristics, or
that such characteristics were uniformly displayed throughout each site, or that
mistrust is the only factor at play. Nevertheless, it became clear that not only is
mistrust a central theme running through each of the characteristics included in
the cluster, but that combinations of these characteristics had a tendency to
interact. Overall, the greater the number of the characteristics, the greater the
likelihood that mistrust impacted negatively on safety processes, practices and
outcomes.
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The cluster of characteristics closely associated with the formation and main-
tenance of mistrust (and, conversely, their absence with high trust) were: (1) a
catalytic event; (2) a divided workforce; (3) mixed messages, inconsistent
actions; (4) a high turnover of senior management; (5) a closed management
style; and (6) a resentment of corporate intervention. In identifying these char-
acteristics, our primary interest was in the factors underlying mistrust, not its
subsequent effects.
A Catalytic Event
In many of the lower-safety sites, a single catalytic event had precipitated a
serious breakdown of trust between management and workers. For example,
one mine experienced a mishandled downsizing, where all worker positions
were ‘spilled’, and workers who wanted to resume working at the mine had
to reapply, generating considerable fear and uncertainty. The consequences in
terms of animosity between workers and the managers perceived to be respon-
sible continued for several years. At two other mines, management ‘cut coal’
during the course of industrial disputes, crossing the picket line to do so. This
meant that management was able to hold out for much longer than would
otherwise have been the case, and in so doing put considerable pressure
on workers to reduce their demands. This action generated acrimony that
continued several years after the event.
Although the precise events varied from case to case, there were striking
similarities between the mines that had experienced such an event in terms of
their negative consequences. Such events created a ripple effect throughout a
mine site’s operations, with mistrust infusing relationships outside the original
context. For example, a dispute concerning a specific incident might impede
good management and worker communications more generally, with a corro-
sive effect on safety initiatives. The ill feeling on the part of the ‘wronged’ party
(usually workers) often persisted for years, flaring up at points of stress, such as
changes in management practices or structures.
In terms of safety, a particularly debilitating consequence of a catalytic event
is its potential to reshape perceptions. Subsequent disputes or disagreements
become framed in such a way as to reinforce prejudices arising from the original
event. In consequence, even when senior management introduces safety initia-
tives in a genuine attempt to raise standards, these may fail to penetrate a
powerful cultural mythology of mistrust. Where this mistrust was not over-
come, workers treated almost all management safety initiatives with suspicion
and refused to buy into them, safety observations were perfunctory, incident-
reporting was trivialized or ignored, systems were honoured more in the
breach, and sophisticated electronic monitoring systems were sidetracked.
This suggests that once lost, trust may be particularly hard to regain.
A Divided Workforce
A second feature found in four lower-safety mine sites was the presence of
highly visible and distinctive divisions within the site workforce, such as
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between workers on staff agreements and those on collective agreements (or
enterprise agreements); between miners who had been rehired in the face of an
impending pit closure and those who had not; between managers (and some
workers) who had come over to a new mine as a ‘block’ from another mine and
those already employed at the recipient mine; and between company employers
and contractors.
Clearly, all work environments to a greater or lesser extent are prone to the
formation of cliques or factions. What was distinctive here was the ways in
which such divisions became a prominent feature of the prevailing work culture.
At one mine, individual contracts (as opposed to collective agreements) were
offered to workers, the inducement to sign such contracts being a higher pay
structure. Among miners, a commonly voiced opinion was that there was a
management attempt to divide and conquer, with the strategy being to get
enough of a core of workers to run the mine without the union. The fact
that some union members chose to go on to contracts created a high degree
of animosity, which was directed at those who accepted management’s offer to
go on to contracts by those who did not. Threats were made and individual
contract workers were ostracized. Outside, property (such as private vehicles)
was damaged, and the extended community of miners’ families was split.
Such divisions generated a tension that undermined both productivity
and safety. It is difficult to maintain high safety standards when one group of
workers will not speak to another group.
Mixed Messages, Inconsistent Actions
A third characteristic associated with mistrust, and common at lower-safety
mines, was a perception of management giving ‘mixed messages’ and failing
to ‘walk the talk’ in terms of safety. The most commonly cited example of such
behaviour involved management exhorting workers to ‘put safety first’, while
placing greater pressure on them to achieve production targets (these two goals
commonly being in tension).
For example, at one mine, workers were required to complete a job safety
analysis ( JSA) card at the start of each shift and when starting a new job.
However, workers told us that management had not provided adequate training
or allocated time to complete the cards. Instead, they reported that if they took
the time out to complete a card, they would incur the wrath of management
for wasting time. In short, there is a strong ‘production comes first’ message
undermining the value of the programme. This in turn leads to tokenism.
Miners admitted that it was common practice to take a week’s worth of JSA
cards home and complete them in advance of the actual jobs, completing them
without thought to actual risks or safety mindfulness as a ‘tick-and-flick’ exer-
cise, or completing them after the job.
Such mixed messages and management turning their backs on workers not
doing things in the safe way generated cynicism and mistrust. There was a
widespread view that the real purpose of safety initiatives is ‘arse-covering’ by
management.
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One aspect of management inconsistency that is deeply resented by workers
and enormously damaging to trust is when there is a perceived breach of ‘no-
blame’ policies. Many companies have introduced such policies in relation to
the reporting of incidents, accidents and equipment damage, as one important
step towards establishing a safety culture (Reason, 1997). However, in some of
the lower-safety sites the no-blame policy was not evenly applied. At one mine,
for example, workers acknowledged that they were not reporting ‘micro-sleep’
incidents (where a worker momentarily falls asleep on the job), notwithstanding
the fact that such incidents could be extremely dangerous (particularly
when operating large, mobile machinery), for fear of losing their job, despite
management claims to the contrary.
High Turnover of Senior Management
At four of the five lower-safety mine sites there was a high turnover of senior
management, including mine managers. One site, for example, had lost approx-
imately 50 percent of its senior management team in the last six to nine months,
and another had several managers in the space of two and half years. Such
experiences can greatly inhibit attempts to build and maintain trust between
management and workers. A worker explained:
This creates inherent problems because people are unable to relate to the mine
manager, they’re unable to relate to the superintendent, because you can’t build that
trust relationship up. . . . With each new person [there are] new ideas, new values,
new ethics, and those situations are confusing sometimes, especially for lower-level
management and employees.
High turnover of management also raises doubts in the minds of workers as to
the viability of the mine, as some workers interpret this as evidence that man-
agement has no long-term commitment to the mine. It also stands in stark
contrast to the experience of workers, who often remain in the same job for
decades. Consequently, if workers fall out with a manager, they can simply wait
them out, which fosters the attitude that ‘I’ll still be here long after you’re gone,
so you’ve got no hold over me’. This makes it difficult to develop a sense of
shared destiny and overcome mistrust.
Closed Management Style
A fifth characteristic was the wider issue of a ‘closed’ management style. There
are a number of dimensions to this. One is the extent to which the management
team is isolated from the workforce, as where they are perceived to be reclusive
and isolated. This causes a distancing often accompanied by a lack of under-
standing of and trust in management actions. At one low-safety mine, for exam-
ple, workers observed that managers ‘disappear into their offices’ whenever
there is a change of shifts, an act that workers perceived as a cowardly way of
avoiding interaction with them. At another mine, senior management is rarely
seen. As one worker stated: ‘I’d say 80 percent of the workforce here probably
don’t interact with management too much at all, except maybe when another
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manager comes into their section ‘‘How you fellows going, blah, blah, blah, see
you later’’’.
In contrast, at higher-safety mines, management created opportunities for
informal and formal engagement, for example, taking advantage of shift
changes to engage with the workforce. Workers expressed a strong preference
for this style of management and reported that it was an important component
of building trust.
Another aspect of a closed management style is a lack of consultation.
Workers at lower-safety mines reported that management safety initiatives
appear ‘out of the ether’, with little input from the workforce in their design
or implementation. This can be particularly debilitating to the ‘ownership’ of
safety initiatives for which worker engagement is essential. For example, at one
mine there were complaints about the constant stream of new safety initiatives
accompanied by little or no prior consultation with the crew, and, at another,
miners were scathing about the lack of consultation in the introduction of
mandatory mini risk assessments for every shift, resulting in rampant tokenism.
Particularly important, according to workers at all mines, was the extent and
means by which management provided feedback, especially in the context of
reporting on accidents, near misses, equipment damage and hazard identifica-
tion. At some low-safety mines, responses to reports are simply posted on a
noticeboard, without any feedback. In contrast, at higher-performing mines,
feedback is a priority and is provided directly to the worker who is the original
source of the report. This occurs even where no action is taken. Workers do not
object to a no-action decision provided that they are kept informed in a timely
fashion, and a reasonable explanation is provided. Not coincidentally, timely
feedback served to build trust in management motives and commitment to
safety.
Resentment of Corporate Intervention
As corporation-wide safety management becomes more sophisticated, this is
inevitably followed by greater corporate intervention in mine site operations,
including safety standards, systems, benchmarks, monitoring and accountability
mechanisms. In Australia at least, this has been magnified by safety legislative
requirements. These twin drivers can reduce site autonomy and, to some extent,
flexibility and capacity for innovation. At some lower-performing mine sites,
corporate intervention may have a second, and unintended, consequence:
generating resentment and mistrust. It was striking that the three lowest-
performing mines (one from each company) displayed the highest levels of
mistrust towards corporate management. As one interviewee stated:
[A]t the higher levels, they’ve decided that they can’t trust people at the mines . . . ‘so
we’re going to give them these standards or we’re going to audit them against these
standards and that will force them to get into line. Tell them that this is what they
have to do before the next audit or there’ll be consequences’ and so on.
Management at each of the lowest-performing sites typically complained that
the site: was an ‘easy target’; was unfairly represented (as the poorest performer)
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in safety statistics and corporate audits (and other sites manipulated their
results); did not have the same access to resources or quality equipment and
technology as better-performing sites; was burdened with a more militant and/
or older workforce; and confronted unfavourable physical characteristics (such
as fractured seams, high levels of methane, water intrusion etc.). In short, these
sites maintain that the ‘cards are stacked against them’. It was beyond the scope
of this project to determine the validity of these claims independently.
However, when these views were put to corporate managers, whilst they
acknowledged that some mines do indeed confront greater physical difficulties,
they rejected any consistent and causal relationship to safety performance – as
evidence of this, one manager noted that their two best safety-performing mines
had vastly different physical characteristics, while another asserted that a
mine site that had once been one of their worst safety performers had, over
several years, become one of their best performers with no discernible change in
technology (over and above that of all their mines) or physical conditions.
There was an element of circularity in the phenomenon of local resentment
of corporate intervention. Lower safety-performing mine sites often perceived
that they were unfairly targeted. This created mistrust and resentment that
undermined the success of corporate interventions and, in turn, invited further
corporate scrutiny and intervention.
Two distinct types of mistrust were identifiable. First, site management
doubted the competence of corporate management to carry out their stated
safety intentions and this bred resentment, exemplified by the statement:
I’ve got no time for corporate at all. I just think they are pretty hopeless. Some of
the systems, there’s no communication. . . . Well, they just put it out, no training, no
nothing, just dump it in their system. . . . We’re always the last to find out. . . . Well
they say every pit stands on its own. Then they want to enforce things over the top
of you from corporate.
This resentment was typically coupled with a belief that corporate management
had placed an unfair safety burden on the site and had failed to provide the
necessary resources to discharge that burden, exemplified by the comment:
I have to say they had a point to prove and they were there to do it. They were there
to give you . . . an overview of your operation. The problem is that I found that some
of the review, the outcomes of that audit, I didn’t have ownership to say ‘Well that’s
not my area’, but it was all lumped back to me to fix it after the audit. Why? I had
no resources, how the hell am I supposed to do all of this, how am I going to do it?
Others had little trust in the ability of corporate management to understand the
ramifications of their safety policies. Seemingly innocuous changes can have
adverse impacts at the mine level, as an interviewee explained:
What they change at the stroke of a pen can have dramatic and far-reaching
consequences at the mine site. We have had to completely revise our management
systems to accommodate a fickle change in one of our standards.
A second, more insidious, form of mistrust was where site management doubted
the motivations of corporate management, and interpreted corporate
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intervention as an indicator of corporate mistrust in site safety competence. In
some cases, this generated resentment and a barely concealed contempt:
Others I think are tolerating it [corporate intervention] because they realize that they
won’t get a job unless they do pay lip service to it. We have a small core of managers
who think it’s a load of crap and they’ve said so, ‘This is all bullshit’ and when you
get to the mine level, because they think it’s all bullshit, they don’t do anything until
the last minute and then your attempts at being professional come to nothing because
you’re operating without all the information.
In contrast, at many of the better safety-performing mines there is far more
acceptance of the desirability, effectiveness and benefits of corporate safety
interventions. Although site management readily admitted they were initially
very sceptical, they changed their minds and recognized the need for greater
corporate oversight and, consequently, greater site accountability. Several site
managers acknowledged this had been a difficult personal journey, but that
their initial opposition was unfounded. The net effect was an increase in trust
of corporate safety capabilities and intentions. Management at lower-safety
mines were yet to make such a transition.
Conclusions
Based on the experiences of 10 mine sites across three companies and two
jurisdictions, this article has identified six cluster characteristics closely con-
nected with the development of mistrust at site level. Such mistrust has a cor-
rosive effect on the implementation of safety initiatives at site level. Although
the six cluster characteristics have been examined individually, they may inter-
act synergistically to amplify mistrust. For example, a catalytic event, such as
spilling and subsequently rehiring a workforce, can accentuate or create divi-
sions in the workforce. Similarly, a high turnover of senior mine management
positions, with the inevitable loss of corporate memory, will increase the like-
lihood of mixed messages being given to middle management, line managers
and workers. Organizational structures can influence management style, as
when a more hierarchical structure reduces opportunities for workers, middle
management and senior mine management to interact, accentuating tendencies
for senior management to be reclusive. Equally, combinations of opposite char-
acteristics can interact to reduce mistrust, as when new organizational struc-
tures result in a flatter management structure that brings line management
much closer to senior management.
When a sufficient number of negative characteristics are present at one mine
site, it is very difficult to prevent that site from spiralling into a cycle of mistrust
where every interaction or decision (including new and genuine safety initia-
tives) is perceived through the prism of past history and mistrust, and dis-
counted and/or resisted accordingly. Conversely, the absence of a sufficient
number of characteristics can foster the building of trust. This suggests the
presence of ‘tipping points’ where a critical mass of characteristics is reached,
‘tipping’ a site down the path of mistrust.
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The behaviour of the mine sites included in this study was consistent with the
tipping point hypothesis. There was a clear division between the lower- and
higher-safety mines in the frequency of the cluster characteristics. The three
lowest-ranked sites each possessed six of the cluster characteristics. In contrast,
the five leading safety sites each had three or fewer cluster characteristics. The
two remaining sites possessed four and five cluster characteristics, respectively,
and were grouped with the lower-safety sites. This suggests that the presence of
a relatively small number of characteristics is not sufficient to push a mine into a
cycle of mistrust, but that the development of mistrust involves a majority of
cluster characteristics, although the strength of each characteristic at a site will
also be important.
The tipping point hypothesis suggests that once characteristics are over this
point, achieving safety improvements will be extremely difficult. This may lead
to extreme responses on the part of corporate management. This was evidenced
at one company that closed an existing, operating mine and reopened it as a
‘new’ mine with a different access point. This provided the opportunity to
make the old workforce redundant and to start again with a ‘clean slate’.
Subsequently, management selected experienced workers from the ‘old’ mine
who were considered to be more aligned with corporate management thinking
(usually, those with weaker union ties), and also selectively recruited ‘suitable’
applicants from outside the old mine’s workforce. One mine manager
summarized the rationale as follows:
Bad culture goes with old mines. It produces an ‘us and them’ approach, and mistrust
of management. Lots of people say the only way to change is a forced closure – to
put the mine in care and maintenance for a minimum of six months and a maximum
of twelve, and then cherry-pick a new workforce – there’d be high agreement on who
we should not reappoint.
This is a strategy that a number of companies have contemplated. For example,
one manager (who was far from alone) suggested that the only solution to
dealing with a pit with a particularly acrimonious history is to ‘shut and
rehire’. In his view:
That should happen. You walk in and survey the whole place, identify the things
going wrong – the one-and-a-half-hour cribs, that X goes home early on Friday and
so on. So you stop all that and shut. But, you’ve got to get buy-in in the future from
the workforce. And you’ve got to bypass the unions. In future, the workers must talk
directly to me. Unions can be there, but then you develop milestones and guidelines,
e.g. zero injuries, then you work development month by month – if they reach this
milestone, this happens [a bonus] . . . if not, there will be 50 percent redundancies
and so on.
The danger of this approach is that it may build mistrust. A far preferable
solution would be to act in ways that avoid the build-up of cluster character-
istics and to ensure that the tipping point is never reached.
What wider implications do these findings have for safety beyond the mining
industry? While the mining industry may be exceptional in its long and bitter
history of industrial conflicts, and management–miner hostilities, in other ways
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it is not. Corporations in many industry sectors confront the problem of ensur-
ing that their far-flung operations behave as corporate management would wish
them to. Indeed, there is evidence that corporations may be mistaken in their
belief that those who are encouraged or required to develop and implement
safety plans, systems and other management-based strategies will necessarily
improve their performance as a result (Gunningham et al., 2003; Parker and
Neilson, 2006). On the contrary, it may well be (as this article suggests) that
site-level management commitment is far more important than management-
based strategies, that management commitment may not exist at individual sites
even if it exists at corporate management level, and that the reason for this may
be the presence of mistrust.
Corporate policymakers generally, therefore, may learn much from the expe-
rience of the mining industry. While some of the cluster characteristics have
particular resonance for the mining industry, the characteristics we identified
can be found in other industry sectors. As such, lessons about how to avoid their
formation have considerable merit, particularly for corporations committed to
improving safety, but unsure how best to achieve it at site level. These lessons
can be summarized as follows.
First, the role of corporate management in creating trust is very important
(Hopkins, 2002b; Whitener et al., 1998). It is they who set the priorities, estab-
lish the values and provide the resources that substantially shape site manage-
ment and workforce responses. Conversely, much hard work at site level can be
quickly destroyed if corporate management is at odds with site management.
However, it is in large part site management, not corporate management, with
whom the workforce has direct contact, and it is the extent to which site man-
agement has the perceived competence, benevolence and integrity to safety
values that will have most influence in shaping workforce perceptions of man-
agement commitment. It will be impossible for site management to build
trust unless they not only espouse the value of a safe workplace, but also dem-
onstrate their commitment to that value by their actions. Unless management
at all levels walks the talk, then worker cynicism about their motivations
will remain high. This research suggests that there are a variety of ways
management can overcome this suspicion, such as by being receptive to, and
responding rapidly to, safety concerns raised by the workforce.
Second, even where site (and corporate) management have a demonstrable
commitment to safety, there remains a substantial impediment if the levels of
middle management below them do not ‘buy into’ the safety message. Here,
mistrust is directed more at senior management’s abilities than its intentions,
although the latter is sometimes also present. Pitzer, for example, found that
middle management showed signs of disillusionment with corporate safety ini-
tiatives (Minerals Council of Australia [MCA], 1999). The present study sug-
gests that this sometimes morphs into resistance by site management to efforts
by corporate management to impose greater accountability and responsibility
upon them, particularly where this involves substantive reporting, auditing and
management systems (these research findings have significant implications
for safety cultures and corporate safety management systems and warrant
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elaboration – these issues are dealt with in detail by the authors in a separate,
forthcoming article; Gunningham and Sinclair, forthcoming [b]). A related
issue is the devolution of safety decision-making and the extent to which work-
ers are empowered to deal with safety issues. Workers were far more likely to
accept and implement safety initiatives if they had a high degree of ownership.
Third, overtly hierarchical relationships serve to constrain trust, as the orga-
nizational trust literature demonstrates. Those at the bottom often have a fear
of exploitation and suspicion that they are being treated unfairly, while those at
the top suspect that the individuals for whom they are responsible are shirking
responsibility or engaging in acts that might endanger the organization
(Kramer, 1996: 216). In the present research, this occurred with line managers,
many of whom reported a lack of support from senior management, with con-
sequences for their trust in those above them. Workers also reported that flat
structures and a lack of demarcation between jobs achieved real benefits, and
many saw value in management not interfering in day-to-day issues.
Fourth, communication is an important factor in overcoming mistrust. A
distinctive feature of high-safety mines was the high level of communication
between workers and management. No single, successful formula for commu-
nication could be identified (communication could be as informal as after-work
barbeques or as formal as weekly safety committee meetings), and much
depends on personal management style. This is consistent with the finding of
Cox et al. (2006: 1126) that ‘managers who are willing to share information
signal to their employees that they can be trusted’.
Fifth, and closely related, is management’s willingness to listen and respond
to workers’ safety concerns. Workers appreciated managers who acted
promptly when they expressed safety concerns, even when this was only to
explain why they did not propose to take any further action. What Reason
(1997) terms a ‘reporting culture’ can only be established when those who
report such incidents trust that they will not be punished, or in any way
adversely treated, for doing so (a ‘blame-free’ culture). This is a good indicator
because workers take a risk in reporting incidents in which they may be at fault,
and will only do so where they are confident that they will not be punished as a
consequence. This is part of a broader issue: the perception of workers that they
will be treated fairly or justly that, as Tyler et al. (1997) have demonstrated, can
serve to reinforce trust. A just culture has been described as ‘comprising an
atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, for pro-
viding essential information, but in which they are also clear about where the
line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour’ (Cox et al.,
2006: 1124). Accordingly, it is only in these circumstances that workers
are likely to act in the collective good. This points to a sixth characteristic
of ‘high-trust’ organizations: an expectation that managers will act with
‘consistency, integrity and concern’, even during periods of conflict or crisis.
All of the above serve to illustrate that trust, and mistrust, are multifaceted.
At the very least, the aspects of trust identified here are mutually reinforcing,
and some of them are so fundamental that it is difficult to conceive of trust
developing in their absence. While these are necessary conditions for the
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creation of trust, they are insufficient in themselves. Without effective worker
engagement, trust between workers and managers clearly cannot be achieved.
Accordingly, the other criteria described earlier are all important in the com-
posite picture, albeit that trust might develop in the absence of a small number
of them.
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Notes
1 A five-year period was chosen because this was the extent to which companies could
provide consistent data, and was deemed to be sufficient to overcome annual aberrations.
2 Subsequent to the research, the mine sites of one of the companies underwent compre-
hensive international safety audits conducted by a specialist team of auditors from their
international headquarters, the results of which were entirely consistent with our own
safety rankings – this provided external support as to the credibility of our ranking
methodology.
3 This process was in accordance with the ethics clearance provided by The Australian
National University to the authors for conducting the research.
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